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INTRODUCTION
Let me introduce you to Steven Pollack. Pollack is a resident of
Highland Park, Illinois. 1 He is also an environmentalist, who enjoys
drinking clean water, eating uncontaminated fish and observing
wildlife on the great lakes near his home. 2 For a long time, the United
States has operated a firing range next to the lake thirteen miles north
of Highland Park. 3 Over the years, errant bullets have escaped the
confines of the range and entered Lake Michigan. 4 These bullets break
down over time and release lead into the lake, which is the source of
drinking water for millions of people, including Pollack. 5 Pollack
decided that he would put an end to this polluting, and he filed suit
against the government seeking an injunction and civil penalties for

∗ J.D. candidate, May 2010, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology. I would like to thank Prof. Hal Morris, Paul Forster, and Sarah Kaplan
for their invaluable help and encouragement.
1
Pollack v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 577 F.3d 736, 738 (7th Cir. 2009), cert.
denied, 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010).
2
Id.
3
Id. at 737–38.
4
Id.
5
Id.
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alleged violations of the Clean Water Act. 6 In Pollack’s case, the
United States government admitted to dumping tons of lead into the
water, but it took the position that there was nothing Pollack could do
about it because he was neither sufficiently exposed to the toxic
chemicals leaching into Lake Michigan, nor had he concretely or
specifically described his leisure time pursuits to show that they were
harmed by the lead. 7 Pollack’s claims were dismissed for want of
standing before his suit even began. 8
Standing is easy to describe but difficult to apply. At a minimum,
standing requires three elements: (1) injury-in-fact; (2) traceability to
conduct of the defendant; and (3) that a favorable decision could
provide redress for the injury. 9 Environmental cases offer a unique
challenge because the harms are generally to nature, not the individual.
Courts agree that an aesthetic injury, such as the death of a few trees,
constitutes an injury; however, the question remains: who is injured?
At common law, many of these aesthetic injuries were not
sufficient to support a claim. However, over time, Congress has
pronounced these injuries to be important. Congress has the power to
create and quantify “new” injuries, as well as address the mechanism
for causation of those injuries. In most environmental cases, Congress
has used this power to provide statutes to exactly describe these
injuries, like the Clean Water Act or the Endangered Species Act. At
the same time, the courts have attempted to maintain their
independence by leaving the greater environmental policy to the
legislature and the executive and refusing to hear any complaint that
does not present a case or controversy. 10 In environmental litigation, a
plaintiff can only allege his subjective loss of these new rights. Often,
a plaintiff must prove that he enjoys seeing or feeling these natural
wonders and that his injury comes from the damage that those
6

Id.
See id.
8
Id. at 743.
9
Id. at 739 (quoting Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1148
(2009)).
10
See generally Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
7
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wonders will suffer. 11 Concededly, this is a standard where the injury
rests solely on the personal preferences of the plaintiff.
In its current form, the standing doctrine allows judges to apply
their own standards and decide who gets into court. 12 Where the court
wishes to preclude a case, it may require strict proof of the elements
supporting standing; in many cases, it effectively requires the plaintiff
to prove its case at the pleading stage. Other courts have applied a
more lenient, sliding standard, demanding more proof as the case
proceeds through each successive procedural step. 13 This approach
requires such a minimal showing that it allows almost anyone to
survive a motion to dismiss. This Note proposes that the strict standard
be used where there is only a procedural injury, but that a sliding scale
be used where there may be an independent basis for standing.
The next section of this Note outlines the development of the
standing doctrine from Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife 14 through
Summers v. Earth Island Institute 15 and examines how several courts
have applied this standard to their cases. Section II provides a
statement of the case for Pollack v. Department of Justice. Section III
provides an analysis of the difficulty of applying the standing doctrine
and proposes an approach that demands more than pleadings, but
removes the court’s license to pre-litigate the merits of the case under
the guise of the standing doctrine.
I. STANDING
Standing is a judicially created doctrine that operates to limit the
types of cases that the court may hear. Courts use it to protect the
validity of the adversarial process by determining whether there is an
actual controversy and whether each side can be adequately
11

See generally Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142 (2009).
See, e.g., Pollack, 577 F.3d at 741.
13
See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne, 588 F.3d 701 (9th Cir.
2009).
14
504 U.S. 555 (1992).
15
129 S. Ct. 1142 (2009).
12
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represented. 16 The requirements for standing are not found in the
Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution, which limits
the courts to hearing cases or controversies, 17 but rather find their
genesis with Justices Brandeis and Frankfurter. 18 Today, Justice Scalia
is considered the expert on the issue of standing. However, as argued
later in this Note, Justice Kennedy, who rarely writes for the Court,
may have had a greater influence on standing doctrine through his
additions and clarifications to the majority opinion. 19
Standing has three fundamental elements:
[A] plaintiff must show that he is under threat of suffering
“injury in fact” that is concrete and particularized; the threat
must be actual and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical;
it must be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the
defendant; and it must be likely that a favorable judicial
decision will prevent or redress the injury. 20
The landmark decision addressing environmental standing is
Sierra Club v. Morton, in which the Supreme Court recognized that
plaintiffs may bring an action based purely on aesthetic harms. 21 Next,
in United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures, the high water mark of environmental standing, the Court
found that a group of students had standing to challenge the Interstate
Commerce Commission’s rates, which made it less expensive to ship

16

See Pollack, 577 F.3d at 738.
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
18
Kelly D. Spragins, Note, Rekindling an Old Flame: The Supreme Court
Revives Its “Love Affair with Environmental Litigation” in Friends of the Earth v.
Laidlaw Environmental Services, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 955, 968 (2000). The doctrine of
standing was developed to prevent activist judges from declaring New Deal
legislation unconstitutional. Id.
19
See, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1148 (2009).
20
Pollack, 577 F.3d at 739 (quoting Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S.Ct.
1142, 1149 (2009)).
21
405 U.S. 727, 741 (1972).
17
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new metal than scrap metal. 22 The Court held that the students
demonstrated an injury by showing that they used the forests, streams,
mountains, and other resources for outdoor recreation, and that the
new rates would make it more expensive to recycle, leading to more
litter in these areas. 23
A. Standing in the Supreme Court
1. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife marked the beginning of the
modern approach to standing in environmental cases.24 In Lujan,
several environmental groups brought an action challenging a
regulation promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior that required
other agencies to engage in a consultation with the Secretary under the
Endangered Species Act, but only when a federal project occurred
within the United States or at sea. 25 The Endangered Species Act
sought to protect listed species of animals against threats to their
continued existence that are directly attributable to the actions of
humans. 26 Therefore, every federal agency must engage in a
consultation with the Secretary of the Interior and ensure that any
activity it authorizes, funds, or carries out will not jeopardize the
continued survival of an endangered species. 27 Originally, the
Secretary’s expert agencies, the Fish and Wildlife Service and the
National Marine Fisheries Service, promulgated regulations extending
this duty to projects occurring on foreign soil. 28 However, in 1986,
these agencies promulgated new regulations, which removed the
requirement for consultation when an activity was conducted on
22

412 U.S. 669, 688 (1973).
Id.
24
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
25
Id. at 558–59.
26
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531–1544 (1988).
27
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
28
Id.
23
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foreign soil. 29 Thereafter, the plaintiffs, organizations dedicated to the
protection of wildlife, filed an action seeking a declaratory judgment
that the new regulation was in error, as well as an injunction forcing
the Secretary to promulgate new regulations extending the duty to
engage in a consultation to activities occurring on foreign soil. 30
At the outset, the Secretary challenged the plaintiffs’ standing
to bring this suit, and the district court, agreeing, dismissed the suit for
lack of standing. 31 On appeal, however, the Eighth Circuit reversed,
finding that the plaintiffs had standing. 32 After remand, the district
court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and ordered
the Secretary to promulgate new regulations. 33 The Eighth Circuit
affirmed summary judgment for the plaintiffs. 34 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari and addressed the Secretary’s standing arguments. 35
Justice Scalia wrote for the majority, holding that the plaintiffs
lacked standing to challenge the Secretary’s regulations. 36 He stated:
Over the years, our cases have established that the irreducible
constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements:
. . . [f]irst, . . . an ‘injury in fact’ 37 . . . [s]econd, . . . a causal
connection between the injury and the conduct complained

29

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559.
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 557, 562. Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice
White, Justice Thomas, Justice Souter, and Justice Kennedy, who wrote a
concurrence joined by Justice Souter on the issue of redressibility. Justice Stevens
filed a separate concurrence and concurrence in judgment. Finally, Justice Blackmun
and Justice O’Connor dissented.
37
Id. at 560 (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756 (1984)).
30
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of 38 . . . [and t]hird, it must be likely . . . that the injury will
be redressed by a favorable decision.” 39
The party invoking the federal jurisdiction has the burden of satisfying
these elements, and since they are not merely pleading requirements,
“each element must be supported in the same way as any other matter
on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner
and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of
litigation.” 40 At the pleadings stage, general factual allegations of
injury may suffice because the court should “presume that general
allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support
the claim.” 41 However, in response to a motion for summary
judgment, the general allegations will no longer be sufficient, and the
plaintiff will be required to set forth specific facts, which should be
taken as true. 42
Where the government directly regulates an individual, standing is
ordinarily found. 43 The problem arises when a plaintiff claims injury
by government regulation of someone else. 44 In these cases, standing
hinges on the actions of the regulated third party and the unrestricted
actions of the plaintiff; therefore, the court will require the plaintiff to
“adduce facts showing that those choices have been made or will be
made in such manner as to produce causation and permit redressibility
of injury.” 45
In Lujan, the plaintiffs alleged that the Secretary’s failure to
consult before funding a project in Sri Lanka would increase the rate

38

Id. (citing Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41–42 (1976)).
Id. at 560–61 (internal quotations omitted).
40
Id. at 561 (citing Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 883–89
(1990)).
41
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
42
Id.
43
Id. at 561–62.
44
Id. at 562.
45
Id. (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975)).
39
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of extinction of endangered species by destroying critical habitat.46
However, according to the Court, although the general desire to
observe endangered species, even for purely aesthetic reasons, is a
cognizable interest, the plaintiffs must demonstrate how they will be
among those injured by the action. 47 One of the plaintiffs asserted that
she had visited the site of the proposed project and had intended to
observe endangered species, including the Asian elephant and leopard;
that the proposed project would damage the habitat of those species;
and that she had been injured because she “intends to return to Sri
Lanka in the future and hopes to be more fortunate in spotting at least
the endangered elephant and leopard.” 48 However, the difficulty of
returning to Sri Lanka became apparent when the plaintiffs were
deposed. 49 Another plaintiff could not clarify when she wished to
return to Sri Lanka: “I don’t know [when]. There is a civil war going
on right now. I don’t know. Not next year, I will say. In the future.” 50
Justice Scalia found that these “some day” intentions to return to Sri
Lanka—“without any description of concrete plans, or indeed even
any specification of when the some day will be—do not support a
finding of the ‘actual or imminent’ injury that our cases require.” 51
The ecosystem nexus theory, argued by the plaintiffs, where
damage in one part of an ecosystem will result in damage to the whole,
was also dismissed by Justice Scalia. According to the Justice, “a
plaintiff claiming injury from environmental damage must use the area
affected by the challenged activity and not an area roughly ‘in the
vicinity’ of it.” 52 At the summary judgment stage, a factual showing of
perceptible harm is required. 53

46

Id. at 562.
Id. at 563.
48
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
49
Id. at 563–64.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 564.
52
Id. at 565–66.
53
Id. at 566.
47
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In addition, Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality 54 , found that
the injury was not redressible because the agency being sued was not
the agency funding the project; it was merely required to provide
information to the agency that was supplying the funding. 55
Furthermore, the amount of funding provided by the agency was a
small fraction of the total funding for the project.56 Therefore, Justice
Scalia found that even if the plaintiffs prevailed, any relief granted was
unlikely to have an impact on whether the project was built. 57
Finally, Justice Scalia addressed the plaintiffs’ claim to a
“procedural injury” stemming from the right to comment on the
proposed funding of the Sri Lankan project. 58 Under the citizen suit
provision of the Endangered Species Act, “any person may commence
a civil suit on his own behalf . . . to enjoin any person, including the
United States and any other governmental instrumentality or agency
. . . who is alleged to be in violation of any provision of this
chapter.” 59 The lower court had held that this provision allowed
anyone to sue when the consultation requirement was violated. 60
Justice Scalia, however, found the plaintiffs’ claims to be a generalized
grievance, which will not support a finding of a controversy. 61 Justice
Scalia analogized this approach to that in Massachusetts v. Mellon,
where the Court held that an individual taxpayer did not have standing
to challenge federal expenditures because the plaintiff only suffered an
indefinite injury, which was shared with all taxpayers. 62 Additionally,
allowing the suit would impermissibly intrude on the executive

54

Id. at 570 (plurality) (this portion was joined only by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justice White and Justice Thomas).
55
Id.
56
Id. at 571.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 571–72.
59
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1988).
60
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572.
61
Id. at 572–73.
62
Id. at 574 (citing Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923)).
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branch. 63 According to Justice Scalia, protecting the public interest is
the duty of Congress and the President. 64 Therefore, a procedural
right, such as the right to comment or to require information gathering,
will not give rise to standing without a particularized injury. 65
In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Souter,
agreed with the essential portions of the majority, but wrote to clarify
two main points. 66 First, Justice Kennedy discussed the importance of
requiring the plaintiffs in this case to announce a “date certain” for
their return to Sri Lanka. 67 The reason that the Court required more
concrete plans is because in this case, it is not “reasonable to assume
that the affiants will be using the sites on a regular basis.” 68 However,
Justice Kennedy was unwilling to completely foreclose any of the
environmental nexus theories, which may give rise to standing under
the right set of facts. 69 Under these facts, Justice Kennedy agreed that
the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a concrete injury sufficient to
support standing. 70
Second, as government becomes more complex and far-reaching,
the Court must “be sensitive to the articulation of new rights of action
that do not have clear analogs in our common-law tradition.” 71
Congress has the power to define new injuries and describe the chain
of causation that can give rise to these injuries. 72 While not the case in
Lujan, a newly recognized injury could give rise to standing.
63

Id.
Id. at 576.
65
Id. at 578.
66
Id. at 579 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id. (citing Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 231
n.4 (1986)).
70
Id. at 580.
71
Id. (“Modern litigation has progressed far from the paradigm of Marbury
suing Madison to get his commission, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), or
Ogden seeking an injunction to halt Gibbons’ steamboat operations, Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).”).
72
Id.
64
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By contrast, Justice Stevens’ concurrence reads more like a
dissent. 73 Justice Stevens would find standing in this case, but would
affirm on the merits, holding that the Endangered Species Act does not
apply to actions taken in other countries. 74 He wrote, “[i]n my opinion
a person who has visited the critical habitat of an endangered species
has a professional interest in preserving the species and its habitat, and
intends to revisit them in the future has standing to challenge agency
action that threatens their destruction.” 75 Justice Stevens argues that
the plaintiffs should have standing based on their interest in observing
wildlife since Congress has found value in protecting endangered
species. 76 In Justice Stevens’ view, the injury is measured by the
environmental harm, rather than the ability of the plaintiffs to
expeditiously visit the affected area. 77
Noting that the Court has found standing to be lacking where the
environmental harm is speculative, Justice Stevens found that under
these facts, the harm to the environment was practically certain. 78
Citing the dissent, Justice Stevens believed that the plaintiffs have at
least created a question of fact: “a reasonable finder of fact could
conclude, from their past visits, their professional backgrounds, and
their affidavits and deposition testimony, that [plaintiffs] will return to
the project sites and, consequently, will be injured by the destruction
of the endangered species and critical habitat.” 79 Further, Justice
Stevens argues that requiring consultation is itself redress for the
alleged injury: “[I]f Congress required consultation between agencies,
we must presume that such consultation will have a serious purpose
that is likely to produce tangible results.” 80

73

See id. at 582 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 582, 590.
75
Id. at 582.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 583.
78
Id. (distinguishing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158–159 (1990)).
79
Id. at 584.
80
Id. at 585.
74
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Justice Blackmun dissented and found that the majority sought to
impose “fresh limitations” on the constitutional authority of Congress
to allow citizen suits for procedural injuries. 81 His dissent focused on
identifying the appropriate standard for reviewing a motion for
summary judgment. 82 In order to survive a motion for summary
judgment, a plaintiff only needs to show that there is a genuine issue
of material fact. 83 According to Justice Blackmun, the Court’s
“function is not [it]self to weigh the evidence and determine the truth
of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for
trial.” 84 The majority never mentions this standard. 85 Accordingly, the
majority requires a standard that is too high. 86 If the Court applied the
“proper standard,” Justice Blackmun argues that it would conclude
that the plaintiffs have advanced sufficient facts to create a genuine
issue for trial concerning whether one or both plaintiffs would be
injured. 87
In Justice Blackmun’s view, requiring a “description of concrete
plans” or “specification of when the some day [for a return visit] will
be” ends up being a mere formality because nothing prevents plaintiffs
from purchasing plane tickets.88 Additionally, Justice Blackmun takes
issue with the majority’s disregard for the potential for nexus harms. 89
While in some cases, a plaintiff must be in close proximity to the
damage to be affected—for example, a person claiming aesthetic
damages from mining activities must be close enough to see the ruined
81

Id. at 589–90 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 590.
83
Id.
84
Id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 591.
88
Id. at 592. Justice Blackmun worries that this requirement will revive
formalistic code-pleading, in the worst case requiring that “a Federal Tort Claims
Act plaintiff alleging loss of consortium . . . furnish this Court with a ‘description of
concrete plans’ for her nightly schedule of attempted activities.” Id.
89
Id. at 594.
82
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landscape—in many cases, an environmental harm in one area may
spread to other areas, giving rise to everyone in its wake. 90
2. Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw
Standing was once again the central issue in Friends of the Earth,
Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services. 91 In Laidlaw, plaintiff
environmental groups sued under the citizen suit provisions of the
Clean Water Act, alleging a violation of the defendant’s permitted
mercury discharge limits. 92 The plaintiffs sought declaratory and
injunctive relief, as well as civil penalties. 93 In Laidlaw, the defendant
purchased an incineration facility in South Carolina and promptly
secured a permit allowing the facility to discharge a limited amount of
effluent into the North Tyger River. 94 The defendant exceeded its
permit limits on several chemicals, including mercury.95 However, the
defendant convinced the state to file an enforcement action against it,
and it agreed to pay a limited civil penalty and “to make every effort to
comply with its permit obligations.” 96 The plaintiffs also filed suit
under the citizen suit provisions of the Clean Water Act. 97 The
defendant moved to dismiss the action based on the settlement with
the state, but the district court held that the state had not diligently
90

Id. (citing Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221
(1986) (harm to American whale watchers from Japanese whaling activities) and
Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992) (harm to Oklahoma residents from
wastewater treatment plant located thirty-nine miles from the border)).
91
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167
(2000). Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court and was joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Justice Stevens, Justice O’Connor, Justice Kennedy, Justice
Souter, and Justice Breyer. Justice Stevens and Justice Kennedy each filed
concurrences, and Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented. Id. at 171.
92
Id. at 173, 176.
93
Id. at 177.
94
Id. at 175–76.
95
Id. at 176.
96
Id. at 176–77 (internal quotations omitted).
97
Id. at 177.
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prosecuted the violations; therefore, the court allowed the plaintiffs’
citizen suit. 98 During the litigation, the defendant ceased all of its
continuing violations. 99 Two years later, the district court instituted a
civil penalty against the facility, but it did not grant an injunction
because the permit violations had ceased. 100 The plaintiffs appealed
the size of the civil penalty, and the defendant argued on appeal that
the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the suit. 101 The Fourth Circuit
assumed, without deciding, that the plaintiffs had standing, but held
that the case became moot because institution of civil penalties
payable to the federal government would not redress the plaintiffs’
injuries. 102
The statutory foundation for this suit is the Clean Water Act’s
citizen suit provision. 103 Under the Clean Water Act, a discharger must
secure a permit under the National Pollution Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES), which imposes strict limits on the amount of
pollutant that can be discharged. 104 Discharge of a pollutant in excess
of a facility’s permit limit constitutes a violation of the Act. 105 Under
§ 505 of the Act, citizens may bring suit to enforce any limitation in an
NPDES permit. 106 “Citizen” is defined as “a person or persons having
an interest which is or may be adversely affected.” 107 Prior to filing a
complaint, the plaintiff must send a sixty-day notice of intent to sue to
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and to the alleged
violator, in order to allow sixty days for the EPA to intervene and give
the violator enough time to comply with its permit. 108 The Supreme
98

Id.
Id. at 179.
100
Id. at 178.
101
Id. at 179.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 173.
104
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1994).
105
33 U.S.C. § 1342(h).
106
33 U.S.C. § 1365(a).
107
33 U.S.C. § 1365 (g).
108
33 U.S.C. § 1365 (b)(1)(A).
99
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Court has held that a plaintiff lacks standing to sue if a defendant, after
receiving a notice from a citizen plaintiff, ceases its alleged violation
by the time the plaintiff files its complaint. 109
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, held that the plaintiffs
had demonstrated that the case was not moot because permit
compliance after a suit is filed does not moot an action for civil
penalties. 110 However, the Court first needed to determine whether the
plaintiffs had standing at the beginning of the case. 111 The defendants
first claimed that there could be no injury in fact because the district
court concluded that there was “no demonstrated proof of harm to the
environment.” 112 The Court held, however, that the relevant showing
for Article III purposes was not the injury to the environment, but the
injury to the plaintiff. 113 In this case, one of the plaintiffs alleged that
he lived a half-mile from the facility; that he occasionally drove over
the river and it smelled polluted; that he would like to fish, camp,
swim and picnic near the river (between three and fifteen miles
downstream of the facility), as he did when he was a teenager, but
would not do so because he was concerned that the water was polluted
by the defendant’s discharges. 114 The Court found that the plaintiffs
had standing because these individuals averred that the “aesthetic and
recreational values of the area will be lessened” by the alleged
discharges. 115 Although these harms were subjective, they were
reasonable fears that prevented the plaintiffs from full use and
enjoyment of the river. 116 Finally, the Court held that the imposition of
civil penalties provided a deterrent effect on potential future
109

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S.
167, 174 (2000) (citing Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484
U.S. 49, 60 (1987)).
110
Id. at 180.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 181.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 181–82. Other members of the plaintiff organization made similar
allegations. Id.
115
Id. at 183.
116
Id. at 184.
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discharges, which was sufficient to support the standing element of
redressibility of the alleged injury. 117
Both Justice Kennedy, in his concurrence, and Justice Scalia, in
his dissent, raised the issue of whether a citizen suit provision was an
unconstitutional delegation of power by the legislature; however,
neither Justice found Laidlaw to be an appropriate case to address that
issue. 118
Justice Scalia’s argument in dissent boils down to a conclusion
that there cannot be an injury to a person if there has been no injury to
the environment. 119 He found that the “concern” that the plaintiffs
exhibited is “woefully short on ‘specific facts,’ and the vague
allegations of injury they do make are undermined by the evidence
adduced at trial.” 120 This argument is based on the fact that the district
court concluded that there was no demonstrable harm to the
environment and that the permit violations did not result in a risk to
human health. 121 The district court’s finding is based on the fact that
the water quality levels in the river are better than the limits placed for
the safety of water bodies that support recreation in and on the
water. 122
Justice Scalia would require the plaintiffs to make some
evidentiary showing that their alleged harms were, in fact,
occurring. 123 He argued that the plaintiffs made nothing more than
conclusory allegations in their affidavits. 124 And, as a matter of public
policy, he believes that the standard endorsed by the majority allows
too many people to assert standing. 125

117

Id. at 187.
Id. at 197 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 209–10 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
119
Id. at 198–99.
120
Id.
121
Id. at 199.
122
Id.
123
Id. at 200.
124
Id. at 201.
125
Id.
118
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3. Summers v. Earth Island Institute
Most recently, the Court narrowed standing in Summers v. Earth
Island Institute. 126 In Summers, the plaintiff environmental
organizations challenged regulations promulgated by the United States
Forest Service, which exempted salvage timber sales of less than 250
acres from the notice and comment provisions of the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 127 NEPA requires that the federal
agency acting as the project proponent engage in an analysis of the
potential environmental impacts of its proposed project and evaluate
the feasibility of potential alternatives. 128
In the summer of 2002, fire burned a significant area within the
Sequoia National Forest, which included the Burnt Ridge area. 129
After the fire, the Forest Service approved the salvage sale on 238
acres of the forest without requiring notice or comment. 130 In
response, the plaintiffs filed their complaint alleging that the Forest
Service failed to follow its own NEPA regulations in approving the
sale. 131 The district court granted a preliminary injunction relating to
the Burnt Ridge portion of the sales. 132 The parties settled their dispute
with regard to one of the parcels, after which the Forest Service argued
that the plaintiffs lacked standing to maintain their action. 133 The
district court found for the plaintiffs and invalidated the regulations at
issue. 134 The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs lacked standing,

126

Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142 (2009).
Id. at 1147.
128
Forest Service Decisionmaking and Appeals Reform Act (Appeals Reform
Act), Pub. L. No. 102-381, tit. III, § 322, 106 Stat. 1419 (note following 16 U.S.C. §
1612.).
129
Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1147.
130
Id.
131
Id. at 1148.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id.
127
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except for the regulations applying to the Burnt Ridge project, and
upheld the nationwide injunction on two of the five regulations. 135
Justice Scalia, back in control of the majority, focused on the
affidavit of plaintiff Bensman in concluding that the plaintiffs lacked
standing because the members of the plaintiff organization did not
allege that they were impacted by a specific timber sale. 136 According
to Justice Scalia, “[i]t is a failure to allege that any particular timber
sale or other project claimed to be unlawfully subject to the
regulations will impede a specific and concrete plan of Bensman’s to
enjoy the National Forests.” 137 Bensman alleged only that he had
visited many National Forests and planned to visit several unnamed
National Forests in the future. 138 While there may be a chance that
Bensman’s travels in the National Forests will intersect with a parcel
that is about to be affected by the regulations, “without further
specification it is impossible to tell which projects are (in respondents’
view) unlawfully subject to the regulations.” 139 Justice Scalia found
that it was unlikely that Bensman’s trips would intersect a Forest
Service timber sale. 140 While the Bensman affidavit referred to several
projects occurring in the National Forest, it did not show any firm
intention to visit those locations. 141 The vague desire to return for a
some-day visit was insufficient to support standing. 142
Finally, the plaintiffs lacked standing to assert a procedural
right. 143 The majority held that “deprivation of a procedural right
without some concrete interest that is affected by the deprivation—a
135

Id.
Id. at 1149–51.
137
Id. at 1150 (emphasis in original).
138
Id.
139
Id. (emphasis in original).
140
Id. (citing Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983)). Justice Scalia found
it would be less likely for Bensman to wander into a timber sale than it would be for
Lyons to be put into a chokehold by police for a second time. Id.
141
Id.
142
Id. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992)).
143
Id.
136
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procedural right in vacuo—is insufficient to create Article III
standing.” 144 And, while a procedural right may lessen the causation
and redressibility hurdles, a plaintiff must still demonstrate a concrete
injury. 145 Because there was no concrete injury to the plaintiffs in this
case, they could not maintain standing for the procedural violation. 146
Justice Kennedy, in his concurrence, stated, “[t]his case would
present different considerations if Congress had sought to provide
redress for a concrete injury ‘giv[ing] rise to a case or controversy
where none existed before.’” 147
In dissent, Justice Breyer outlined a probabilistic approach to
determining injury in fact. 148 Justice Breyer argued that the sheer
number of members in the plaintiff organizations meant that it is more
likely than not that one or more of the members will be affected by the
timber sales. 149 Justice Breyer stated that this probability should
satisfy the requirement of imminence. 150 In other words, because the
plaintiffs have demonstrated a realistic threat of injury, they should
have standing. 151
With regard to the procedural injury, Justice Breyer argued that
the plaintiffs have standing because (1) members of the group have
used affected parcels in the past and are likely to do so again in the
future; and (2) the group’s members have opposed the Forest Service’s
activities in the past using procedural methods and will likely use
these methods in the future. 152 He would find this sufficient to

144

Id. at 1151.
Id.
146
Id.
147
Id. at 579–80 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
148
Id. at 1156–58 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
149
Id.
150
Id.
151
Id. at 1158 “Many years ago the Ninth Circuit warned that a court should
not ‘be blind to what must be necessarily known to every intelligent person.’” Id.
(citing In re Wo Lee, 26 F. 471, 475 (1886)).
152
Id.
145

427
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2010

19

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 5

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 5, Issue 2

Spring 2010

demonstrate that the plaintiffs have received a concrete injury with the
deprivation of their right to comment. 153
B. Post-Summers Application of the Standing Doctrine
Although Summers can be seen as a reaffirmation of Lujan, the
federal circuits continue to apply the doctrine of standing haphazardly
in environmental cases. What follows is a discussion of recent cases,
which allow some plaintiffs to bring their cases and preclude others.
1. Connecticut v. American Electric Power
Eight states, a city, and three land trusts separately sued six of the
largest energy companies and alleged that the defendants’ operations
contributed to the public nuisance of global warming. 154 The plaintiffs
sought an abatement of the defendants’ ongoing operations of fossil
fuel generation units, which were responsible for at least a portion of
global warming emissions. 155 According to the plaintiffs, these
ongoing operations cause and will continue to cause serious harms
affecting human health and natural resources. 156 The defendants
moved to dismiss the complaint, and the district court, agreeing, held
that the plaintiffs’ complaint presented a non-justiciable political
question. 157 The court refused to address the standing issue because “it
[wa]s so intertwined with the merits and required the court to address a
political question.” 158 On appeal, the defendants again argued that the
plaintiffs lacked standing. 159
The Second Circuit reversed the lower court; it held first, that
global warming does not present a non-justiciable political question,
153

Id.
Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. 582 F.3d 309, 315 (2d Cir. 2009).
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
Id. at 332.
159
Id.
154
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and second, that the plaintiffs had standing to pursue these claims. 160
In examining the plaintiffs’ standing, the court stated, “[t]he Supreme
Court has commented on the lowered bar for standing at the pleading
stage, stating that general factual allegations of injury resulting from
the defendant’s conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we
presume that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are
necessary to support the claim.” 161 Further, under Second Circuit
precedent, “at the pleading stage, standing allegations need not be
crafted with precise detail, nor must the plaintiff prove his allegations
of injury.” 162
First, the court addressed the ability of the states to bring the suit
in parens patriae. 163 Parens patriae is a common law doctrine where
the sovereign state can sue to protect the interests of its citizens, “for
the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect themselves.” 164
This allows a state to short cut the Lujan standing test. 165 A state must
have a quasi-sovereign interest to protect. 166 Because of the damage to
these states from global warming, and because the individuals
involved could not seek individual redress, the states involved had
standing parens patriae. 167
160

Id.
Id. at 333 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992))
(internal quotations omitted).
162
Id. (citing Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Buffalo v. Downtown Dev.,
Inc., 448 F.3d 138, 145 (2d Cir. 2006)).
163
Id. at 334.
164
Id. (citing Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
United States, 136 U.S. 1, 57 (1890)). This doctrine is demonstrated in Georgia v.
Tennessee Copper Co., where the State of Georgia sued to enjoin Tennessee Copper
from emitting noxious fumes that would travel into the borders of Georgia. 206 U.S.
230 (1907). Parens patriae standing is found when a state (1) has an interest apart
from the interests of particular private parties, (2) expresses a quasi-sovereign
interest, and (3) alleges injury to a substantial segment of its population. Alfred L.
Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 603 (1982).
165
American Electric Power, 582 F.3d at 337.
166
Id. at 338.
167
Id. at 339.
161
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Second, the court addressed whether all of the plaintiffs had
proprietary (Lujan) standing. 168 In this case, the plaintiffs clearly
alleged harms resulting from climate change. 169 For example,
California alleged that it already was experiencing decreased mountain
snowpack, which leads to declining water supplies available to the
state’s residents. However, the bulk of the alleged harms were based
on the future impacts of global warming. 170 The defendants argued
that the injuries were too speculative. The court, looking to
Massachusetts v. EPA, held that the risk of global warming was real
and that the plaintiffs therefore had sufficiently alleged injury-in-fact
to support their standing. 171
In addition, the court held that the plaintiffs satisfied the element
of causation. 172 The court stated that this element is “in large part
designed to ensure that the injury complained of is not the result of the
independent action of some third party not before the court.” 173 In this
case, plaintiffs sued the “five largest emitters of carbon dioxide in the
United States.” 174 The defendants argued that the plaintiffs could not
identify their individual portions of the harm, nor could the plaintiffs
say that abatement of their individual emissions would prevent future
harms caused by global warming. 175 However, the court held that for
standing purposes, the plaintiffs were not required to meet the same
causation requirements as those of a nuisance claim in order to support
their standing. 176 In addition, the plaintiffs did not need to sue each
and every polluter since the pollution of any one may be shown to

168

Id..
Id. at 341–42.
170
Id. at 342.
171
Id.
172
Id. at 345.
173
Id. (citing Friends of the Earth v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d
149, 161 (4th Cir. 2000)) (internal quotations omitted).
174
Id.
175
Id.
176
Id. at 346.
169
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cause some or part of the injury suffered. 177 Therefore, the plaintiffs
met their burden. 178 According to the court, “they are not required to
pinpoint which specific harms of the many injuries they assert are
caused by particular Defendants, nor are they required to show that
Defendants’ emissions alone caused their injuries.” 179
Finally, the court found that the injuries were redressable because
any decrease in emissions would lessen the impact of global
warming. 180
2. The Wilderness Society v. Kane County, Utah
The Wilderness Society v. Kane County, Utah provides an example
of a sufficient affidavit alleging aesthetic injury. 181 In Wilderness
Society, the plaintiff environmental organizations brought an action
against the county government and claimed that a county ordinance,
which opened preserved lands to the use of off-road vehicles, was
preempted by the Federal Land Policy and Management Act. 182 The
district court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, and the
Tenth Circuit affirmed. 183
In this case, the plaintiffs were able to support their standing by
alleging harms to their “health, recreational, scientific, spiritual,
educational, aesthetic, and other interests.” 184 One plaintiff stated
specifically, “I have visited public lands in Kane County, and
particularly lands within the Monument, at least four times per year for
multiple days since 2003, and intend to return as often as possible, and

177

Id. at 347 (citing Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Powell
Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1990)).
178
Id.
179
Id.
180
Id.
181
581 F.3d 1198 (10th Cir. 2009).
182
Id. at 1208.
183
Id.
184
Id. at 1210. The other affidavits alleged similar uses and harms. Id. at 1211.
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certainly within the next six months.” 185 She actively “seek[s] out and
prefer[s] to use those federal public land[s] that are more wild; in other
words, those lands that are not burdened by [off-road vehicle] use.” 186
Finally, she stated that she was less likely to return to these impacted
sites because of the disruptions caused by the off-road vehicles. 187
The Tenth Circuit held that these allegations were more than
sufficient: the plaintiffs stated that they had visited the impacted sites;
those sites would be negatively impacted by the allowance of off-road
vehicles; and the plaintiffs intended to visit those sites again, but were
less likely to do so because of the off-road vehicles. 188 The dissent
argued that there was no legally protected right at issue in this case. 189
However, according to the court, a plaintiff’s injury is judicially
cognizable if it “is simply the sort of interest that courts think to be of
sufficient moment to justify judicial intervention.” 190 And, under Tenth
Circuit precedent, injury to recreational and aesthetic interests is a
sufficiently protectable interest. 191
3. Center for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne
In Center for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne, the plaintiff
environmental organizations sued the Fish and Wildlife Service for
promulgating regulations that allowed oil and gas companies to make
non-lethal takings (incidental harassment) of polar bears and pacific
185

Id.
Id.
187
Id.
188
Id. at 1210.
189
Id.
190
Id. (citing In re Special Grand Jury 89-2, 450 F.3d 1159, 1172 (10th Cir.
2006)) (internal quotations omitted).
191
Id. at 1212 (citing San Juan Cnty., Utah v. United States, 503 F.3d 1163
(10th Cir. 2007)) In addition, the court cited a leading treatise: “[T]he phrase ‘legally
protected interest’ provides ‘ample opportunity for mischief should a court be bent
on denying the reality of a sufficient injury-in-fact.’” Id. (citing 13A CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531.4, at 149 (3d ed.
2008)).
186
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walrus in the Beaufort Sea during their oil and gas exploration
activities on the northern coast of Alaska. 192 Similar to the allegations
in Lujan and Summers, the plaintiffs alleged that these regulations
violated the Marine Mammal Protection Act and the National
Environmental Policy Act. 193 The district court upheld the regulations
and granted summary judgment to the Fish and Wildlife Service. 194
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision, finding that the Fish and
Wildlife Service did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in finding that
the oil and gas activities would have a negligible impact on the
affected endangered species. 195
Before reaching the merits of the case, the court first had to
address a challenge to the plaintiffs’ standing to bring the case. 196
Following Summers, the court sought to determine whether any of the
plaintiffs had “such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction.” 197 Although
generalized harm to the environment is insufficient to confer standing,
“[t]he interest that individuals have in observing a species or its
habitat, ‘whether . . . motivated by esthetic enjoyment, an interest in
professional research, or an economic interest in preservation of the
species’ is sufficient to confer standing.” 198
In this case, the plaintiffs alleged that “they have viewed polar
bears and walrus in the Beaufort Sea region, enjoy doing so, and have
plans to return.” 199 Moreover, if the plaintiffs’ allegations are proven
true, the governmental regulations will create an imminent and
192

588 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2009).
Id.
194
Id.
195
Id. at 711–12.
196
Id. at 707. The Service raised the standing issue for the first time on appeal,
after Summers was decided; however, challenges to standing can be raised at any
time. Id. (citing United States v. Viltrakis,108 F.3d 1159, 1160 (9th Cir. 1997)).
197
Id. (citing Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S.Ct. 1142, 1149 (2009))
(citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
198
Id. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 582 (1992)
(Stevens, J., concurring)).
199
Id.
193
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concrete harm to those interests by allowing others to harm those
endangered species. 200 “Unlike the alleged injury in Summers, this
injury is geographically specific, is caused by the regulations at issue,
and is imminent.” 201 Overall, the plaintiffs were not simply
challenging the regulations in the abstract. 202 Unfortunately for the
environmental plaintiffs, the regulations themselves were upheld by
the court. 203
4. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA
In Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, the class of environmental
plaintiffs, a group of landowners with property located along the
Mississippi Gulf coast, sued several energy, fossil fuel, and chemical
companies, for the emission of greenhouse gases by the defendants
that allegedly contributed to global warming. 204 According to the
plaintiffs, those emissions increased surface air and water
temperatures, which in turn caused a rise in sea levels and added to the
ferocity of Hurricane Katrina, all of which combined to destroy the
plaintiffs’ private property, as well as public property used by
members of the class. 205 The class of plaintiffs alleged common law
nuisance, trespass, negligence, unjust enrichment, fraudulent
misrepresentation, and civil conspiracy. 206 The defendants moved to
dismiss these claims on the grounds that the plaintiffs lacked standing
and that the case presented non-justiciable political issues. 207 The
200

Id.
Id.
202
Id.
203
Id. at 712.
204
585 F.3d 855, 859 (5th Cir. 2009), vacated for rehearing en banc, 598 F.3d
208 (5th Cir. 2010), appeal dismissed for lack of quorum, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir.
2010). N.B. The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal after the Spring 2010 semester
had ended.
205
Id.
206
Id. at 859–60.
207
Id. at 860.
201
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district court granted this motion and dismissed the claims. 208 The
Fifth Circuit reversed with respect to the nuisance, trespass, and
negligence claims; it held that the plaintiffs had standing and that the
issue of global warming was not a political question. 209
In addressing the standing challenge, the court first noted that
because this was a diversity case based on state common law claims,
the plaintiffs must satisfy both state and federal standing
requirements. 210 However, Mississippi’s standing requirements are
very liberal: “[a]ll courts shall be open; and every person for an injury
done him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy
by due course of law, and right and justice shall be administered
without sale, denial, or delay.” 211 Therefore, the main focus was
whether the plaintiffs had standing under federal law. 212
In determining standing, “[t]he claimant bears the burden of
establishing standing, and ‘each element [of the three-part standing
inquiry] must be supported in the same way as any other matter on
which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and
degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the
litigation.” 213 According to the Sixth Circuit, “[a]t the pleading stage,
general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s
conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we presum[e] that
general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to
208

Id.
Id.
210
Id. at 861 (“Where, as here, jurisdiction is predicated on diversity of
citizenship, a plaintiff must have standing under both Article III of the Constitution
and applicable state law in order to maintain a cause of action.” (citing Mid-Hudson
Catskill Rural Migrant Ministry, Inc. v. Fine Host Corp., 418 F.3d 168, 173 (2d Cir.
2005)).
211
Id. (citing MISS. CONST. art. III, § 24); see also State v. Quitman Cnty., 807
So. 2d 401, 405 (Miss. 2001) (“In Mississippi, parties have standing to sue ‘when
they assert a colorable interest in the subject matter of the litigation or experience an
adverse effect from the conduct of the defendant, or as otherwise provided by
law.’”).
212
Id.
213
Id. at 862 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61
(1992)).
209
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support the claim.” 214 In addition, the court differentiated between the
standing inquiry for common law claims and injury to public rights. 215
In this case, the plaintiffs’ claims were based on common law theories
of nuisance, and the defendants’ challenges were based on causation;
this “essentially calls upon [the court] to evaluate the merits of
plaintiffs’ causes of action,” which at the early stages of the litigation
is “misplaced.” 216 The absence of a valid cause of action is not a
question of standing: “jurisdiction . . . is not defeated . . . by the
possibility that the averments might fail to state a cause of action on
which petitioners could actually recover.” 217 The court held that the
plaintiffs, relying on scientific reports, had standing, and while they
will be required to substantiate their assertions at a later time, at the
pleading stage, at least, the court must accept their allegations as
true. 218
5. Native Village of Kivalina v. Exxonmobil Corp.
Villagers inhabiting a small arctic island sued many of the
country’s largest emitters of greenhouse gases and alleged that these
emissions contributed to global warming, which in turn caused a loss
of sea ice on their island and exposed them to greater dangers. 219 The
sea ice protects the village from winter sea storms, and the erosion of
the sea ice will force the village to relocate at a cost of 95 to 400
million dollars. 220 The Kivalina alleged causes of action in federal
common law and state common law nuisance, civil conspiracy, and
214

Id. (citing Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 168 (1997)).
Id. The court discusses various articles in coming to the conclusion that
when a case presents a common-law tort claim, standing will be found. Id. at 862
n.3.
216
Id. at 864.
217
Id. (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 685 (1946)).
218
Id.
219
Native Vill. of Kivalina v. Exxonmobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D.
Cal. 2009).
220
Id.
215
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concert of action. 221 The defendants filed various motions to dismiss;
they argued that the case presented a political question because there
were no judicially discoverable standards upon which to adjudicate it
case and that the plaintiffs lacked standing. 222 The court agreed with
the defendants and therefore, it dismissed the suit. 223
When a defendant challenges subject matter jurisdiction (i.e.,
standing), a plaintiff “must show in his pleading, affirmatively and
distinctly, the existence of whatever is essential to federal jurisdiction,
and if he does no do so, the court, on having the defect called to its
attention or discovering the same, must dismiss the case, unless the
defect be corrected by amendment.” 224 In a Rule 12(b)(1) challenge,
the court should “assume[] all factual allegations to be true and draw[]
all reasonable inferences in [the plaintiff’s] favor.” 225 However, if the
moving party makes a “speaking” motion and submits materials
outside of the pleadings, “it then becomes necessary for the party
opposing the motion to satisfy its burden of establishing that the court,
in fact, possesses subject matter jurisdiction.” 226 The challenge in this
case was facial only. 227
The crux of the standing issue in this case was that the plaintiffs
were unable to trace their alleged injuries to any particular
defendant. 228 However, they argued that environmental plaintiffs suing
under the Clean Water Act have standing where they show that each
“defendant (1) discharged some pollutant in concentrations greater
than allowed by its permit, (2) [the discharge was] into a waterway in
which the plaintiffs have an interest that is or may be adversely
221

Id.
Id.
223
Id.
224
Id. (citing Tosco Corp. v. Cmtys. for a Better Env’t, 236 F.3d 495, 499 (9th
Cir. 2001)).
225
Id. (citing Doe v. See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2009) and Castaneda
v. United States, 546 F.3d 682, 684 n.1 (9th Cir. 2008)).
226
Id. (citing Colwell v. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 558 F.3d 1112,
1121 (9th Cir. 2009)) (internal quotations omitted).
227
Id.
228
Id.
222
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affected by the pollutant[,] and (3) that this pollutant causes or
contributes to the kinds of injuries alleged by the plaintiffs.” 229 The
court, however, distinguished between violations of the Clean Water
Act and the discharge of greenhouse gases, finding that contrary to the
specific limits set for dischargers to water, there are no standards
governing the amount of greenhouse gases that may be emitted. 230 In
addition, each defendant could point out several more emitters of
greenhouse gases, which prevented the plaintiffs from demonstrating
that the named defendants were the seed of their injury. 231
Additionally, the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that they fell
within the “zone of discharge.” 232 In order to satisfy the “fairly
traceable” requirement for standing, the court must draw a distinction
between “the plaintiffs who lie within the discharge zone of a polluter
and those who are so far downstream that their injuries cannot fairly
be traced to that defendant.” 233 The court gives examples: an eighteenmile distance between the point of discharge and the area of plaintiff’s
use of the body of water would be too much, 234 and where the bodies
of water used run hundreds of miles, discharges in those bodies are
insufficient. 235 In this case, the court found that everyone would fall
within the relevant geographical zone, which would effectively

229

Id. (citing Pub. Interest Research Group v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc.,
913 F.2d 64, 72 (3d Cir. 1990)) (emphasis in original); but see Tex. Indep. Producers
and Royalty Owners Ass’n v. E.P.A., 410 F.3d 964, 974 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that
this presumption can be overcome if the defendant can point to another potential
seed cause of the injury).
230
Native Vill. of Kivalina v. Exxonmobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D.
Cal. 2009).
231
Id.
232
Id.
233
Id. (citing Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Powell Duffryn
Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 72 (3d Cir. 1990)) (internal quotations omitted).
234
Id.
235
Id. (citing Tex. Indep. Producers and Royalty Owners Ass’n v. E.P.A., 410
F.3d 964, 974 (5th Cir. 2005)).
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eliminate the issue of geographic proximity, thereby allowing anyone
to sue. 236
Finally, the court was not persuaded by the claims of “special
solicitude” similar to Massachusetts v. EPA. 237 Here, the plaintiffs
were not challenging the actions of the United States government; they
were simply seeking tort damages. 238 Because they are not seeking to
have the government enforce a right that they gave up to enter the
union, they cannot pursue this case under the guise of the quasisovereign “special solicitude.” 239
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Background
In the nine-month period leading up to Pollack’s lawsuit, the
United States Coast Guard discharged 62,584 bullets, consisting
mostly of lead, into the Great Lakes. 240 Lead has been listed as a toxic
chemical under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-toKnow Act. 241 It is a toxic metal that, even at low levels, may cause a
range of health effects, including behavioral problems and learning
disabilities. 242 The health effects of lead are most severe for infants
and children. 243 For these receptors, exposure to high levels of lead in
drinking water can result in delays in physical and mental
development. 244 In adults, lead can cause kidney problems or high
236

Id.
Id.
238
Id.
239
Id.
240
Pollack v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 08 C 320, 2008 WL 4286577, at *1
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 2008).
241
See 42 U.S.C. § 11002; 40 C.F.R. § 372.65; Pollack v. U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, No. 08 C 320, 2008 WL 4286577, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 2008).
242
Lead in Drinking Water, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/safewater/lead/ (last visited April 26, 2010).
243
Id.
244
Id.
237
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blood pressure. 245 Although the main sources of exposure to lead are
ingesting paint chips and inhaling dust, the EPA estimates that ten to
twenty percent of human exposure to lead may come from lead in
drinking water. 246
1. The Clean Water Act
The original goals of the Clean Water Act (CWA) were to make
all United States waters fishable and swimmable by 1983 and to
eliminate the discharge of all pollutants into navigable waters by
1985. 247 In order to accomplish this objective, the CWA regulates
several types of discharges. At issue in this case are point sources,
which include “any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance.” 248
A typical point source would be the discharge pipe from a factory.
Point sources are regulated under the National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES), which sets stringent limits on a
facility’s right to discharge. A discharge of any pollutant in excess of
the allotment in the facility’s NPDES permit is a violation of the
CWA. 249 If a facility does not have an NPDES permit, any discharge is
illegal. 250
The CWA requires that the EPA enforce the terms of the NPDES
permit. 251 In addition, citizens may act as private attorneys general and
sue a discharger who operates in violation of its permit. 252 However,
unlike the United States Attorney who may bring a suit on behalf of
the Sovereign, a citizen must have interests and have been negatively
impacted in order to have standing under the act.253
245

Id.
Id.
247
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(1)–(2) (2006).
248
See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
249
33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
250
Id.
251
33 U.S.C. § 1319.
252
33 U.S.C. § 1365.
253
Id.
246
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2. Rule 12(b)(1): A Civil Procedure Primer
A motion to dismiss based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1) is a challenge to the subject matter jurisdiction of the court,
commonly in the form of an attack on the standing of the plaintiff. 254
Rule 12(b)(1) motions come in two forms: first, those that attack the
sufficiency of the jurisdictional allegations, and second, those that
attack the facts asserted as the basis for jurisdiction. 255 Facial attacks
are subject to the same familiar standard as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion:
the court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations and
provide all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. 256 By
contrast, when the facts themselves are challenged, “the court is not
bound to accept the truth of the allegations in the complaint.” 257 The
plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the court’s jurisdiction by
competent proof. 258 And the court may look to evidence beyond the
face of the complaint. 259
B. The District Court Opinion
Pollack’s first claims of injury relate to impacts to drinking
water. 260 However, the court reasoned that Pollack lives in Highland
Park, thirteen miles south of the North Chicago water intakes. 261
Highland Park’s water supply comes from intakes different from North
254

FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1).
Pollack v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 08 C 320, 2008 WL 4286577, at *2
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 2008)
256
Id. at *2 (citing United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d
942, 946 (7th Cir. 2002)).
257
Id. (citing Commodity Trend Serv., Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading
Comm’n, 149 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 1998)).
258
Id.
259
Id.
260
Id. at *2.
261
Id.
255
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Chicago. 262 In addition, Highland Park’s latest water quality sampling
results showed that Highland Park had three sampling sites with lead
in excess of fifteen parts per billion (“ppb”), the federal limit for
drinking water, but the overall lead level in the city’s drinking water is
below that level. 263
Pollack also contended that North Chicago’s drinking water has a
higher concentration of lead, and given the dynamic nature of the lake,
there is a real risk that lead from North Chicago will migrate to
Highland Park. 264 The court found that, even assuming that the
plaintiff’s contention about the movement of water in the lake was
accurate, both North Chicago and Highland Park would still have lead
levels below the federal limit. 265
As an alternative injury, Pollack alleged that he experienced
aesthetic injuries: (1) the enjoyment he gets from observing the
migration of shorebirds and water fowl to and from the Great Lakes
watershed is lessened by his concern that the lead munitions will harm
the birds; (2) he is less likely to use the public areas along the Illinois
portion of Lake Michigan because he fears that the lead munitions at
Foss Park and the beach below the range will harm visitors to those
areas; and (3) his desire to consume fish from waters of the United
States is decreased because he fears that the fish are coming into
contact with water contaminated by bullets from North Chicago
range. 266
While the court agreed that there is “no question that injury to
aesthetic interests, like enjoying wildlife and the natural environment,
can be sufficient to confer standing,” Pollack had nonetheless failed to
make a requisite showing of injury-in-fact. 267 An injury-in-fact
262

Id. at *2 (citing CITY OF HIGHLAND PARK, 2008 DRINKING WATER
QUALITY REPORT 1, http://www.ci.highlandpark.il.us/pdf/pw/waterQualityReport.pdf) (URL leads to the most recent water
quality report)).
263
Id.
264
Id. at *3.
265
Id. at *3.
266
Id. at *4.
267
Id. at *4.
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requires more than an injury to a cognizable but abstract interest; it
requires that the person seeking redress must be among those
injured. 268
In evaluating his affidavit, the court focused on what Pollack did
not say. 269 Pollack did not say that he “(1) watches birds that feed at,
nest on or routinely use the land or water near the range and his pursuit
is being tarnished by fear that the bullets will harm the birds; (2) has
stopped using the land near the range, or uses it less, because of his
fears of contamination; or (3) has stopped consuming, or decreased his
consumption of, Lake Michigan fish because he fears that the bullets
have contaminated it.” 270 The court held that Pollack’s claimed
injuries were more of a generalized interest in the health of the Great
Lakes, not a specific harm that affected him in any personal way. 271
C. The Seventh Circuit Opinion
1. Majority Opinion by Judge Manion
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Pollack’s claims. 272
Judge Manion, writing the opinion, found that Pollack failed to
demonstrate injury-in-fact. 273 The majority begins with a citation to
the Supreme Court’s most recent standing decision, Summers v. Earth
Island Institute. 274 Judge Manion focused on limitations of judicial
power and avoidance of infringement of the legislative and executive
branches. 275
268

Id. at *4.
Id. at *4.
270
Id. at *4.
271
Id. at *4. The other Blue Eco member’s affidavit was virtually identical to
Pollack’s. Id. Therefore, because none of the members of Blue Eco had standing,
Blue Eco cannot have standing. Id.
272
Pollack v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 577 F.3d 736, 737 (7th Cir. 2009).
273
Id.
274
Id. at 739.
275
Id.
269
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The court first reviewed several precedents.276 First is Summers,
where the Supreme Court held that the vague desire to return to an
affected area was insufficient to satisfy the requirements of
standing. 277 The majority then discussed Sierra Club v. Franklin
Power, which found standing for a plaintiff based on her likely
exposure to pollutants coming from a plant that would be built.278 In
addition, the court discussed Friends of the Earth v. Gaston Copper
Recycling Corp., where the Fourth Circuit held that a plaintiff had
standing when he was located downstream of a facility that was
violating its permit. 279
However, the court determined that Pollack’s exposure was not as
likely as the plaintiffs in Franklin Power and Gaston Copper.
Pollack’s distance is much farther than that of the plaintiff in Gaston
Copper. 280 In addition, according to the court, everybody knows that
air pollution can spread the three miles in Franklin Power, but the
same cannot be said for water pollution. 281 Because Pollack can prove
neither that he is downstream of the site of the discharges, nor that the
lead will spread the thirteen miles, he lacks an injury in fact.
Taken to the extreme, Pollack’s argument for standing would
allow anyone on Lake Michigan, even those living 250 miles away, to
sue. 282 The majority also held that Pollack’s aesthetic injuries are too
uncertain to provide standing. 283 His desire to eat fish is similar to the
allegations in Lujan and Summers in that he alleges merely a
generalized injury. 284
276

Id. at 739–40.
Id. (citing Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142 (2009)).
278
Id. at 740 (citing Sierra Club v. Franklin Cnty. Power, 546 F.3d 918 (7th
Cir. 2000)).
279
Id. at 741(citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling
Corp., 546 F.3d 918 (4th Cir. 2008).
280
Id.
281
Id.
282
Id. at 742.
283
Id. at 742–43.
284
Id.
277
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Pollack also failed to demonstrate that he has an actual aesthetic
interest in the affected area because at the time of filing, Pollack had
never been to Foss Park, nor did he have any plans to visit. 285
However, Pollack’s allegations stated that he enjoys the entire Illinois
coastline, or on a larger scale, the Great Lakes watershed. 286 For these
reasons, Pollack’s interests were too generalized to grant standing. 287
“At bottom [the plaintiffs] appear to seek the simple satisfaction of
seeing the [environmental] laws enforced.” 288
2. Concurrence by Judge Cudahy
To Judge Cudahy, “[t]his is without question a close case.” 289 In
general, standing seems to “appear and disappear from one case to the
next depending on subtle twists in the allegations, turning between the
real and the hypothetical.” 290 Judge Cudahy wrote separately to “make
the point that the Supreme Court’s case law on [the] subject is both
unclear in purpose and extraordinarily difficult to reconcile.” 291
Standing becomes a particular problem when a citizen-suit provision
potentially sets the injury bar below what the Court requires to
demonstrate standing. 292
The CWA provides that “any citizen may commence a civil action
on his own behalf against any person . . . who is alleged to be in
violation of an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter.” 293
The act also incorporates a citizen suit provision, granting standing to
285

Id. Subsequently, Pollack visited Foss Park; however, the Court held that a
plaintiff cannot manufacture standing once the suit has commenced. Id. at 743 n.2.
286
Id.
287
Id.
288
Id. (citing Jaramillo v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 162 F.3d 675, 677 (D.C.
Cir. 1998)).
289
Id. at 743 (Cudahy, J., concurring).
290
Id.
291
Id.
292
Id.
293
33 U.S.C. § 365(a)(1) (2006).
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any “person or persons having an interest which is or may be
adversely affected.” 294 This provision has been interpreted to confer
standing to the constitutional limit. 295
After reviewing the cases, Judge Cudahy stated: “These
statements raise more questions than they answer. What is an ‘affected
area’? How do we determine whether someone’s aesthetic or
recreational values will be ‘lessened’ other than by their say-so? What
counts as a ‘trifle’ sufficient to place someone ‘among the
injured’?” 296 “Is Highland Park, thirteen miles away, close enough to
be ‘among the injured’?” 297
Judge Cudahy first probed the majority’s engagement of the
relevant case law. 298 He pointed out that Pollack’s facts are similar to
those in Franklin Power, in that the court cannot determine, from the
evidence before it, the extent of the impact of the contamination. 299
Further, he attacked the majority decision as a departure from its
precedent in Franklin Power by implementing a narrower and more
demanding requirement. 300
Judge Cudahy asserted that the Supreme Court in Laidlaw found
that affidavits attesting to a reduced use of a natural resource out of a
reasonable fear and concern were adequate to document an injury in
fact. 301 However, in this case, there is a factual challenge to Pollack’s
standing. 302 Because it is undisputed that the defendants regularly
discharge lead into the lake, Judge Cudahy found that the narrower

294

33 U.S.C. § 365(g).
Pollack, 577 F.3d at 743 (citing Friends of the Earth v. Gaston Copper
Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 152 (4th Cir. 2000)).
296
Id. at 744.
297
Id.
298
Id.
299
Id.
300
Id. at 745.
301
Id. (citing Friends of the Earth v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d
149, 159 (4th Cir. 2000)).
302
Id.
295
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question is whether Pollack had a reasonable fear that his drinking
water was unsafe. 303
Judge Cudahy then analyzed the majority’s fact-finding and came
to the conclusion that the majority was simply incorrect in its
assessment of the flow of the lake. 304 Further, it served no purpose to
take Pollack’s standing arguments to the extreme. 305
According to Judge Cudahy, the focus of this exercise should have
been the evidence that the defendants presented to refute Pollack’s
allegations. 306 Judge Cudahy argued that the defendants proved that
Highland Park draws its water from a discrete area of the lake different
from the area presumably affected by the firing range. 307 In addition,
Highland Park attributes the lead in its own system to corrosive pipes,
not water pollution. 308 In this case, the defendants were able to
demonstrate that the plaintiff’s fears were not “reasonable.” 309
Judge Cudahy agreed with the majority that Pollack’s affidavit did
not give standing with regard to his aesthetic injury. 310 Because
Pollack did not allege that he uses the affected area, his affidavit
alleged too generalized of an injury to support standing. 311
III. ANALYSIS
Standing is used by judges to ensure that the parties have a reason
to be in court. It is used to weed out the plaintiffs with too little at
issue. In the environmental context, this often leaves the activist
outside of the courthouse. At the same time, it prevents sham plaintiffs

303

Id. at 743.
Id. at 745.
305
Id. at 746.
306
Id.
307
Id.
308
Id.
309
Id.
310
Id.
311
Id.
304
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from entering a case that may allow a polluter to escape the full weight
of its liabilities.
A. Determining the Appropriate Standard of Review When the Facts
Themselves are Challenged
Standing challenges are generally seen through three lenses:
facial, factual, and summary judgment. At one end, where the
defendant brings a facial attack, the court must merely look at the
allegations and determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the
necessary elements to support its standing. This process is similar to
the familiar Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss. In this case, the court
should assume that all of the allegations are true and take all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. 312 Courts have even
gone so far as to assume that a general allegation of harm will
encompass a specific and concrete injury under this standard.313
At the opposite end is Lujan, where standing was challenged by a
motion for summary judgment. 314 In this case, the Court demanded
concrete evidence of a future injury. 315 This standard was appropriate
because the harms to the environment were a substantial distance from
the plaintiffs’ homes, which made it reasonable for the Court to infer
that the alleged harms to the plaintiffs would not actually occur
because it was unlikely that the plaintiffs would make the trip again. 316
The Lujan approach results in a mini-trial by affidavit, which places
the burden on the plaintiff to prove its evidence to the judge. It
presents a higher hurdle for the plaintiff than the traditional summary
judgment standard, where the plaintiff survives if it can show that a
reasonable jury could find in its favor. Application of the Lujan
312

See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 333 (2d Cir. 2009).
See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US. 555, 561 (1992); American
Electric Power, 582 F.3d at 333; Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 859 (5th
Cir. 2009).
314
See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562–64.
315
See id.
316
See id. at 579–80 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
313
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standard has allowed courts to pre-litigate claims and act as factfinders, effectively removing the role of the jury from these cases.
However, as argued by the dissent, this standard does not truly fit
within the summary judgment framework. 317 It is dangerous to apply,
especially where the elements of standing are necessarily intertwined
with the merits of the case, because it requires too much from the
plaintiff by shifting the burden of proof before trial.
Adding to the confusion is Laidlaw, where the court broadened
standing by evaluating subjective harms. Laidlaw is laudable because
it opens the courthouse to environmental plaintiffs and effectively
gives meaning to the words that Congress provided in the citizen suit
provisions of the CWA. The rule in Laidlaw is that plaintiffs will have
standing if their reasonable fears of contamination adversely affect
their use and enjoyment of nature. 318 This provides an acceptable
objective method of evaluation for alleged subjective harms.
At the same time, Laidlaw demonstrates the problem with judicial
fact-finding. Laidlaw remains a missed opportunity in this respect. In
this case, the Court began with the factual proposition, found by the
district court, that no measurable injury to the environment occurred as
a result of the defendant’s violation of the CWA. This finding is in
contrast with the will of Congress, which declared that any violation is
an injury. 319 The Court could have addressed this fundamental factfinding directly and held that any violation of the CWA is an injury
because Congress says it is. It is Congress that has the power to define
new injuries. 320 However, the Court tiptoes around this finding of fact
and instead finds standing based on a reasonable fear of
contamination.
The failure of the majority to address this issue was pointedly
raised in dissent by Justice Scalia, who argued that if there is no harm,
317

See id. at 589–90 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envt’l Serv. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S.
167, 183–84 (2000).
319
See id. at 174 (citing Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342, 1365).
320
See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
318
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there can be no foul. 321 The problem with this argument, in this case,
is that Congress legislated the harm and called the discharge of
mercury in excess of a permit allowance a foul. It is not for a district
court to find facts contrary to a lawful enactment of the legislative
branch. However, Laidlaw remains the law and has led to much
confusion, especially for Steven Pollack.
The Court again addressed standing in Summers. 322 This time, the
Court required the plaintiff to allege specific facts in order to survive a
motion to dismiss. In Summers, Justice Scalia found that because the
amount of challenged timber sales was so small in relation to the total
amount of preserved forest, the likelihood that a given timber sale
would impact any of the plaintiffs was incredibly small. This approach
is similar to the approach taken in Lujan, which demanded concrete
plans to visit a project site. This represents a weak factual comparison
by the Court. Justice Breyer, writing in dissent, argued that the
probabilities actually favor the plaintiffs: based on the sheer number of
member plaintiffs, it was very likely that at least one of the members
will be impacted by a timber sale. This probability alone should have
provided standing for the plaintiffs under the facts of this case.
Justice Kennedy, again in concurrence, could have voted and
decided this case. However, he explained that the burden-shifting was
again appropriate because the injury, the right to comment on a given
timber sale, was procedural in nature. 323 Presumably, Justice Kennedy
required a greater showing for a procedural injury because Congress
has spoken on the causation and redressibility issues by lowering the
bar on those prongs. However, he hinted at the possibility that the
result would be different if the injury claimed was more than just a
right to be heard.

321

Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 198–99.
See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S.Ct. 1142 (2009).
323
Id. at 1153 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
322
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B. Application of the Standing Doctrine to Pollack v. United States
By demanding specific facts, the Seventh Circuit applied an unfair
standard to Steven Pollack’s affidavits. 324 This burden-shifting
standard is only appropriate where the likelihood of injury is small.
The environmental injury in this case is not on the other side of the
world. Pollack lives within thirteen miles of the alleged contamination.
Compared to the plaintiffs in Lujan, Pollack merely has to hop into his
car to be exposed. Under Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Lujan, this
level of burden-shifting is not appropriate when the proximity to the
harm is that close. 325 Nor is Pollack attempting to hit a moving target,
like the plaintiffs in Summers. In fact, based on the proximity and
certainty of the environmental harm, the burden should actually shift
in the other direction, favoring Pollack. 326
Pollack is factually similar to Summers, in that the potentially
affected area is very large, but the actually affected area is very small.
In Summers, the national forests covered millions of acres, but the
challenged timber sales accounted for a very small portion of the
forest. Similarly, the Great Lakes are a vast expanse of fresh water,
and the government’s actions impacted only a small portion of the
lakes. However, the factual similarities end there. Summers is
distinguishable because there, the possibility of harm was far from
certain to happen, and it was even more difficult to pinpoint where it
would happen if it did. By contrast, the government’s actions in
Pollack had already happened in a discrete location, less than twenty
minutes by car from Pollack’s home. 327
More importantly, Pollack’s alleged harms are not procedural in
nature. Procedural injuries relate to information-gathering, such as the
right to comment on a proposed agency action or the requirement that
one agency consult with another to help it determine whether its
324

Pollack v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 577 F.3d 736, 742 (7th Cir. 2009).
See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 579–80 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
326
Compare Lujan, 504 U.S. 555 with Pollack, 577 F.3d 736.
327
Compare Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S.Ct. 1142 (2009) with
Pollack, 577 F.3d 736.
325
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actions will impact endangered species. 328 Pollack has alleged that the
federal government illegally dumped lead into Lake Michigan in
violation of the CWA. 329 Pollack has a statutory right to clean water
under the CWA, and Congress has declared that any violation of the
CWA is an injury. There is nothing procedural about it. And again,
according to Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, this time in Summers,
burden-shifting is not the appropriate standard. 330
Under the facts of this case, Pollack alleged that he was exposed
to elevated levels of lead, above the ambient levels of the lake, in his
drinking water. This is a particularized injury, meeting the first part of
the test.
The problem with standing in this case is actually the issue of
causation and redressibility. 331 By citing the City of Highland Park’s
water quality report, the government argued that it did not cause the
increases in lead in Pollack’s drinking water. In response, Pollack
failed to provide anything more than conclusory allegations to support
his claims of causation. Further, because Pollack could not show that
the removal of the lead source would decrease the amount of lead in
his drinking water, his injury was not redressible. Pollack was unable
to point to any question of fact with regard to this allegation. At a
typical summary judgment hearing, the court would enter summary
judgment for the government. Therefore, in this case, the dismissal of
Pollack’s claims relating to drinking water impacts was appropriate,
albeit under the wrong standard.
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit applies this unfair standard to
Pollack’s aesthetic injuries. Although they are also not procedural
injuries, the court again demanded concrete allegations, misapplying

328

Compare Summers, 129 S.Ct. 1142 (injury includes right to comment on
timber sales) with Pollack, 577 F.3d 736 (injury includes exposure to a toxic
chemical).
329
Pollack, 577 F.3d at 741.
330
See Summers, 129 S.Ct. at 579-80 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
331
See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 345–47 (2d Cir.
2009).
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Summers to allow it to read Pollack’s affidavit into absurdity. 332 This
approach is clearly at odds with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Center
for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne. 333 Factually, the cases are the
same: a group of environmental plaintiffs challenge the actions of the
government that affect a large body of water. Based on the early
posture of the case, the court should assume all allegations to be true
and give the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences. 334 More
specifically, the court should assume that general allegations
encompass more specific allegations. 335 Pollack’s use of the Illinois
portion of the coast of Lake Michigan would include Foss Park, not
the entire seventy-plus-mile coastline. Pollack’s enjoyment in
observing wildlife in the Great Lakes region would include those
migratory birds who fly south in the winter and are exposed to lead
before crossing Pollack’s path in Highland Park. And as for Pollack’s
desire to eat freshwater fish, the court should have found that this
necessarily includes Lake Michigan fish, including those exposed to
lead.
In fairness, it is not the court’s burden to produce appropriate
affidavits. However, the court took the time to address what could
have been alleged to prove his standing. Despite the fact that the
district court entered its dismissal and the case was appealed and
argued before Summers, the court did not give a second thought to
applying Summers to this case. Pollack’s affidavits, which focused on
his reasonable fears of impacts, were clearly tailored to the Court’s
standard in Laidlaw. A better course of action would have been to
remand and allow Pollack to resubmit his affidavit for conformance
with Summers.
332

See Pollack v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 577 F.3d 736, 742 (7th Cir. 2009)
(“Taken to its extreme, Pollack’s argument would permit any person living on or
near Lake Michigan to assert that he has been harmed by the bullets, because the
lead could potentially have been carried to every part of the lake.”).
333
See 588 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2009).
334
Id. at 711.
335
See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992); Connecticut
v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 333 (2d Cir. 2009); Comer v. Murphy Oil
USA, 585 F.3d 855, 859 (5th Cir. 2009).
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C. Use of State Courts as an Alternate Remedy
For every wrong, there should be a right. This is a fundamental
principal of many state constitutions. 336 It is even truer in the case of
environmental harms, where the fish and trees cannot march into court
to protect their rights. Environmentalists may find friends in some
state court systems. A litigant who lacks standing in federal court may
find redress in the state court system by suing his or her own state.
Massachusetts v. EPA has been widely read as finding a special right
of the state to bring an action on behalf of its citizens. 337 Under the
right circumstances, an environmental plaintiff may be able to force
the hand of his state.
Notably, in Pollack, the court failed to consider whom Pollack
sued. Pollack sued the President, who is both responsible for violating
and enforcing the law. This case set up an interesting conflict of
interest within the government; however, if the government is taking
Pollack’s water, Pollack should be compensated. 338 Takings problems
are often brought to the courts.
Therefore, one seeking to have environmental laws enforced can
possibly muster standing by suing the state and alleging that the state
failed to protect his interests. Then, whether by settlement or
judgment, the state could be forced—by its own courts—to file an
action against the polluter. Further, standing can be found under the
state’s special solicitude.
Additionally, extending this “special solicitude” to larger nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) may provide a better way to
support standing. Many people join NGOs precisely because they feel
that their government is failing to protect their environmental interests.
336

See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. I, § 12 (“Every person shall find a certain remedy
in the laws for all injuries and wrongs which he receives to his person,
privacy, property or reputation. He shall obtain justice by law, freely, completely,
and promptly.”).
337
See, e.g., American Electric Power, 582 F.3d at 337-38.
338
See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“. . . nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.”).
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The commonality of interest among a diverse body of membership
makes it more likely that the group as an entity will be impacted.
Additionally, that commonality of interest may make many “nonconcrete” future plans more concrete. The probabilistic injury
requirement is not as persuasive when applied to an individual or
small group. However, with larger groups, there may be more
members than certain states have citizens. In these cases, it is more
probable that a member of Sierra Club will be impacted than a citizen
of Vermont. 339 However, the state of Vermont would have standing,
where the Sierra Club would not. At the very least, a suit on behalf of
a large environmental group should swing the probabilities and not
require concrete plans like in Lujan or Summers.
D. Is Standing Still Relevant?
Whether standing is still relevant seems to be a question that no
one asks before reciting the rule from Lujan. Fundamentally, the
standing doctrine has lost its purpose. Originally developed to prevent
rogue courts from declaring acts of Congress unconstitutional, it is
now more often used to frustrate the will of individuals attempting to
enforce the acts of Congress. In general, the environmental plaintiff
will sue because he feels that the executive, usually the EPA, has
failed to enforce a given statute or regulation. 340 He does not seek to
invalidate an act of Congress itself.
Standing is constitutional in nature, but it is not itself of the
Constitution. It is common law and nothing more. Properly
understood, standing is the judiciary interpreting its role under the
Constitution. Congress is equally allowed to interpret the Constitution,
and it has clearly done so by passing environmental statutes. Under
these statutes, Congress has allowed citizens to enforce these
provisions. Despite the clear intent of Congress to change the common
339

Compare the Sierra Club, with over 700,000 members (Summers v. Earth
Island Inst., 129 S.Ct. 1142, 1151 (2009)), with Vermont, having 631,760 citizens, (
National and State Population Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/popest/states/NST-ann-est.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2010).
340
E.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US. 555 (1992).
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law where the environment is concerned, the courts continue to apply
the same common law of standing to these new statutory rights.
Additionally, science has improved and has been incorporated into
the laws. We have a better understanding of the complexity and
interconnectedness of our natural world than we had during the New
Deal or even at the first Earth Day. We now understand how the
aquatic systems interconnect and how greenhouse gas emissions can
affect an entire planet. Despite all of this, courts have refused to
recognize environmental nexus harms.
Maybe it is time to retire standing as a hurdle in environmental
cases. It served well in preventing a few activist judges from
frustrating the will of Congress, but it has now outlived its usefulness.
As applied, standing allows these same types of activist judges to
override the careful deliberations of Congress by reasoning that a
given plaintiff does not fall within a radius of injury. In many cases,
standing is used to pre-litigate the fundamental elements of a case. The
courts pay lip service to the requirements that the burden of proof for
standing is not the same as for negligence causation or injury, but
something lower. However, in many instances, the courts require a
higher burden and shift it to the plaintiffs earlier in the litigation.
In addition, all too often, standing is confused with the political
question doctrine, with the court avoiding the appearance that it is
interfering with the executive’s discretionary decision-making. 341
However, most traditional environmental cases no longer pose a
political question. Congress has already spoken. Because Congress has
spoken so clearly on the issue of environmental contamination of our
nation’s air, water, and land, the political question doctrine is simply
inapplicable to these cases.
Finally, environmental settlements may be set aside if it can be
shown that there was a lack of prosecution by the plaintiff. 342 This
prevents sham suits by requiring the defendant to ensure that there is a
341

See, e.g., Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009)
(greenhouse gases do not present a political question).
342
See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc.,
528 U.S. 167, 177 (2000).
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real plaintiff. No longer must the court take this role. Therefore,
without the historic considerations supporting the doctrine of standing
in the environmental context, standing should be retired, as it is an
impediment to environmental plaintiffs suing to protect our air, water,
and other natural resources.
CONCLUSION
Despite an impressive catalogue of precedent, the application of
standing remains haphazard. Moving forward, courts need to separate
actual physical injuries from procedural injuries. The CWA provides a
right to water free from unlawful discharges; NEPA, on the other hand,
provides parties with the right to review and comment on proposed
actions. Under Lujan and Summers, CWA violations should be subject
to a different, less stringent standard.
Second, standing is far from certain; however, courts need not
engage the facts of the case to make appropriate decisions because
aesthetic injuries provide a subjective injury. The plaintiff is the only
party with knowledge of the areas that it has used in the past, as well
as the areas that it intends to use in the future. The appropriate legal
standard is whether a reasonable jury could find an injury.
Third, if all else fails, an environmental plaintiff may seek a
remedy at the state level. Many state constitutions profess to provide
their citizens with a right to every wrong. Under the right set of
circumstances, this may allow a plaintiff citizen to sue his government
in order to force the state to protect its own environmental interests; in
doing so, the plaintiff gains the state’s special solicitude to garner
standing.
Finally, although it remains highly contested, standing is no
longer relevant in the context of traditional environmental claims. The
doctrine, which was originally developed to protect Congress from the
judiciary itself, has now been hijacked by the executive to avoid the
will of Congress. Additionally, Congress, interpreting the Constitution
for itself, has clearly spoken on most environmental issues. The courts
should defer to Congress, instead of allowing outdated conventions of
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common law to prevent the stated purposes of improving the
environmental quality of this country.
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